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The landmark Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 transforms the landscape of consumer credit in
the United States. 1 Many of the changes have been high-profile and accordingly attracted
considerable media and scholarly attention, most notably the establishment of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. 2 Even specific consumer reforms, such as a so-called “plain
vanilla” proposal, drew hot debate and lobbying firepower. 3 But when the dust settled, one
*
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for reviewing drafts, as well as Carol Yur for research assistance.

1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(hereinafter “Dodd-Frank”).

2

The Bureau was initially proposed as an Agency; its conversion to a Bureau was both a source of contention and
transition of uncertain significance. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Downgrade of Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Threatens Obama's Overhaul Plan, L.A. TIMES (March 4, 2010), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/04/business/la-fi-financial-reform4-2010mar04; The Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Punishing Consumers to “Protect” Them, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/22/dont-punish-consumers-in-the-name-ofprotection/?feat=home_headlines; Tom Petruno, Debate Heats up over “Financial Protection Agency” Proposal
(L.A. TIMES, online ed., July 23, 2009), available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2009/07/harvardlaw-professor-elizabeth-warren-and-rep-jeb-hensarling-r-texas-are-in-a-new-smackdown-this-week-over-the-ideaof.html; Paul Krugman, Financial Reform Endgame, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/opinion/01krugman.html. As an example of the reasoned, deliberative
engagement of ideas within the academy, consider the critique that the agency/bureau would “risk reversing the
decades-long trend towards the democratization of credit[;] create a ‘supernanny’ agency . . . designed to
substitute the choice of bureaucrats for those of consumers[; and] jeopardize the financial recovery.” David S.
Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit,
22 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV., 277, 280 (2010). A compromise emerged in the commutation of the “Agency” into a
“Bureau” of the Federal Reserve Board, which may have been a deft middle road or a largely atmospheric move
given the as-enacted Bureau’s independent budgetary powers, director, etc. See Dodd-Frank at §§ 1011-1012, 124
Stat. 1964-66, § 1017, 124 Stat. 1975-79.
3

See Associated Press, Congress Wary of “Plain Vanilla” Bank Proposal Industry Thinks President Obama's Proposal
Would Be Too Intrusive (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32968985/ns/businessconsumer_news/; Richard H. Thaler, Economic View: Mortgages Made Simpler (N.Y. TIMES, online ed., July 4, 2009),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/business/economy/05view.html. Plain vanilla rules (offering
safe harbor to financial product providers who offer exotic products in conjunction with simplified ones) find
origination in Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Financial Services
Regulation, New America Foundation (2008), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf_behavioral_v5.pdf. One lobbyist at a recent conference described the Barr
et al. paper as “terrifying” upon realizing it was authored by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury who would
become a chief architect of Dodd-Frank. See Nessa Feddis, Vice-President and Senior Counsel for Regulatory
Compliance, American Bankers Association, Remarks at the 2011 Marquette Law School Public Service Program:
New Directions in Consumer and Community Financial Protection (Feb. 25, 2011).
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profoundly transformative innovation that did not garner the same outrage as plain vanilla and
CFPA did get into the law: imposing upon lenders a duty to assure borrowers’ ability to repay. 4
Ensuring a borrower’s ability to repay is not an entirely unprecedented legal concept, to be
sure, 5 but its wholesale embrace by Dodd-Frank represents a sea change in U.S. consumer
credit market regulation. This article does three things regarding this new duty to assess a
consumer’s ability to pay mortgage loans. First, it tracks the multifaceted pedigree of this
requirement, looking at fledgling strands in U.S. consumer law as well as other areas such as
securities law; it compares too its more robust embrace in foreign systems. Second, it offers
conjecture regarding just how this broadly stated principle might be put into practice by the
federal regulators. Finally, it provides a brief normative comment, siding with the supporters of
this new obligation on lenders.
I.

Description: What Is It and Where Did It Come From?
A. Ability to Pay: The Statutory Requirements

As enacted, Dodd-Frank section 1411(b) amends TILA chapter 2 (15 USC 1631 et seq.) by
inserting a new section 129C. Title XIV of Dodd-Frank is subtitled the “Mortgage Reform and
Anti-predatory Lending Act,” and section 1411 provides the following new obligation on all
mortgage lenders (originators and brokers):
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS.
(a) Ability to Repay.(1) In general.—In accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Board, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless
the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination
based on verified and documented information that, at the time
the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability
to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes,
insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and
assessments.6
In fleshing out the discharge of this duty, Dodd-Frank continues:
(3)Basis for determination. – A determination under this
subsection of a consumer’s ability to repay a residential mortgage
loan shall include consideration of the consumer’s credit history,
current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably
assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or
4

Dodd-Frank at § 1411, 124 Stat. 2142.

5

See infra the discussion of U.S. precedents and analogues.

6

Id.
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the residual income the consumer will have after paying nonmortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, employment
status, and other financial resources other than the consumer’s
equity in the dwelling . . . . A creditor shall determine the ability
of the consumer to repay using a payment schedule that fully
amortizes the loan over the term of the loan.7
Similar requirements of assuming repayment ability are found in the cognate-spirited
Credit CARD Act, with near-identical terminology. 8 (CARD preceded Dodd-Frank in passage, but
its content is part of omnibus reform of the financial markets.)
B. Past as Prologue: Pre-Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulations
Those versed in contract law doubtless appreciate the departure from the spirit of
caveat emptor that these revisions impose. Contract Law 101 insists that you are not your
brother’s keeper,9 and this is especially so with lenders. “[A]bsent special circumstances, a loan
does not establish a fiduciary relationship between a commercial bank and its debtor.” 10
Caselaw repeatedly affirms that lenders need only look out for themselves and has consistently
rejected attempts to inject a duty to analyze the borrower’s ability to pay.11 “[T]he lender has

7

Id., at 2143.

8

Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 124 Stat. 1743
(2009) (‘‘A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer under an open end consumer credit
plan, or increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer considers the ability of the
consumer to make the required payments under the terms of such account.”).

9

See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817):
The maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept into the law, if the
province of ethics had been co-extensive with it. There was, in the present case, no
circumvention or manoeuvre practised by the vendee, unless rising earlier in the
morning, and obtaining by superior diligence and alertness that intelligence by which
the price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a romantic equality that is
contended for on the other side. Parties never can be precisely equal in knowledge,
either of facts or of the inferences from such facts, and both must concur in order to
satisfy the rule contended for. The absence of all authority in England and the United
States, both great commercial countries, speaks volumes against the reasonableness
and practicability of such a rule.

10

th

Das v. Bank of America, 186 Cal. App. 4 727, 740 (2010).

11

See, e.g., Renteria v. U.S., 452 F. Supp.2d 910 (D. Ariz. 2006) (lack of duty is because any assessment would be
for lender’s, not borrower’s, protection); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savs. & Loan, 231 Cal.App.3d 1089 (1991)
(commercial lenders look after own interests only); Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App.27 (1980) (same). I am
grateful to John D. Wright for suggesting these sources in his paper, Dodd-Frank’s “Abusive” Standard: A Call for
Certainty, 6 (2011) available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Dodd_Frank_Abusive_Standard_Paper.pdf.

3
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2011

3

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 33 [2011]

no judicially imposed duty to ensure ability to repay the loan . . . .” 12 In fact, “lenders do not
even owe borrowers a duty of care to avoid negligence in the lending process . . .” 13 One bank
lawyer confidently asserted that “Strong public policies support a solvent financial system and
low barriers to home ownership and these policies militate against exposing mortgage lenders
to fiduciary duties and litigation risks.” 14
No more under Dodd-Frank. This is a huge change to commercial law. Yet the seeds of
change were cross-metaphorically percolating well before 2010. Consider the recent history of
residential mortgage regulation. 15 Prior to 1982, there were good, old-fashioned rules (not
standards) imposed by statute on mortgage originators, such as, for example, the hard cap of a
90% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for improved real estate loans issued by national banks and
maximum thirty-year full amortization terms for residential mortgages. 16 Then the headiness
of 1980s deregulation brought such developments as the Garn-St. Germain Act 17 (and the
related Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act), 18 which boldly dispatched such
backward-thinking, heavy-government suffocation of consumer credit. Recall that the
Community Reinvestment Act was passed in 1977, 19 and so such deregulatory moves were not
12

Frank A. Hirsch, The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the Mortgage Lending Industry: The Subprime
Meltdown Fuels the Fires of Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 23 (2008) (noting, however, FDIC regulatory action
enjoining lender from making loans without assessment of ability to pay at fully indexed rate). Hirsch provides a
lengthy collection of case law citations.
13

Id.; see, e.g., Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1093 n. 1 (1991) (“The
relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not fiduciary in nature. A commercial lender is
entitled to pursue its own economic interests in a loan transaction. This right is inconsistent with the obligations of
a fiduciary which require that the fiduciary knowingly agree to subordinate its interests to act on behalf of and for
the benefit of another.”); Tenenbaum v. Gibbs, 813 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Plaintiffs have no
distinct cause of action to recover damages for negligence because, as a mortgagee bank, Eastern Bank did not
owe any duty of care to ascertain the validity of the documentation presented by the individual who falsely
claimed to have authority to act on behalf of the borrower corporation.”).
14

Hirsch, supra note 12, at 11-12 (citation omitted).

15

Mortgage regulation has a complex and institution-specific history in this country, dating back well before the
1970s. This historical analysis is restricted to the 1980s and beyond to underscore the significance of the 1982
changes.
16

Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. 371, §24(a)(1) (1974) (repealed).

17

Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320 (1982).

18

Title VIII of the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545
(1982), codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3801 et seq. Another similarly spirited deregulatory statute was the Depository
Institutions Reregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
19

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128 (1977), Title VIII of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1147.
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only consonant with the spirit of the 1980s but could be couched in the credit-opening rhetoric
of bringing homeownership to historically underserved communities under the civil-rights era
policies of the CRA. 20 With traditional mortgage lenders liberated from their “stodgy”
underwriting standards, housing would come to everyone at last! 21
Post Garn-St. Germain, regulators basked in their newfound freedom. One could have
predicted history unfolding two ways at this inflection point: (1) regulators might have taken
over to “fill the void” after the rollback and promulgate an all-encompassing swath of
regulation to discipline (or, depending on one’s priors, suffocate) the mortgage market in the
post-LTV cap environment, or (2) regulators might have “gotten the message” and taken a
hand-off, light-touch approach, loath to impose regulations that could be seen as mere retreads of the now-unfashionable LTV limits. Regulators got the message. The OCC, for
example, considered using its rulemaking power over national banks to craft new underwriting
restrictions on mortgages (along the lines of, e.g., a new LTV cap), but politely declined:
“Decisions concerning the forms and terms of national bank lending are properly the
responsibility of each bank’s directorate and management.” 22 One by one, regulations were
systematically eliminated over origination standards for real estate loans. 23 The last to fall –
proscriptions on loans with an LTV ratio greater than 100% and those with longer than forty20

This linking of the CRA with relaxed underwriting standards is a common bank lobbying move. See infra note 21.
Of course, an even more cynical account would be one of trying to save the thrifts during a high-inflation period by
facilitating “product innovation,” such as adjustable rate mortgages. In retrospect, encouraging thrift risk-taking
may not been such a great idea. See FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/.
21

I use “stodgy” particularly here because it was the characterization used by the ABA’s Vice-President and Senior
Counsel for Regulatory Compliance at a lively recent speech. See Feddis, supra note 3. Her gist was that the banks
were faulted for being too “stodgy” in underwriting mortgages in the 1970s, but are now being mulcted in being
too carefree. Moreover, as she pointed out, one man’s “suitability” could be another’s “discrimination,” if more
rigorous underwriting standards effect a disparate minority impact. (See also Preserving the American Dream:
Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 144 (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement of Douglas Duncan, Senior Vice-President, Mortgage
Bankers Association) (“[T]he consequences of a suitability requirement for mortgage lenders is that overly cautious
lenders may violate the letter of federal anti-discrimination laws and the spirit of community reinvestment
laws.”).) Thus the pejorative use of “stodgy” seems intended to downplay the benefits from further stringency in
underwriting standards (imposed by government regulation). Fair enough, from a lobbyist’s perspective, I
suppose, but I will offer my own characterization of compelled increased underwriting stringency as “prudential,
crisis-averting cost internalization” just to see if it has a better ring.
22

Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,699 (Sept. 9, 1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and
34).
23

An excellent summary of the regulatory history during this period is found in a current Working Paper by Vincent
DiLorenzo, The Federal Financial Consumer Protection Agency: A New Era of Protection or Mode [sic] of the Same?,
St. John Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-0182 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674016.
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year amortization terms – were finally repealed in 1996.24 In less than two decades, mortgage
lenders had gone from facing hard LTV caps to facing discipline by the market alone, with all its
attendant foibles.25
There was some attempted backlash. In 1991, Congress jumped in and required
regulators to adopt uniform standards for real estate lending in the FDIC Improvement Act.26
This finally prompted the OCC to issue its “Real Estate Lending Standards.” 27 But again, a lighttouch approach prevailed; the OCC eschewed rules in favor of “guidelines” that included
general admonitions toward “prudential underwriting standards.” 28 OTS followed suit. 29 Even
with these interventions, however, the policy impetus was with “safety and soundness” – the
underlying mandate for depository institution regulation – not with any duty to the borrower as
the beneficiary of some form of protective relationship.30 Thus even when goaded by Congress
into action, the agencies remained deep in the thrall of free-market laissez faire that was the
legacy of Garn-St. Germain. How strong was their resistance-to-regulate urge (and how illconceived in 20/20 hindsight)? Consider the aforementioned Real Estate Lending Standards.
They specifically excluded – as of course unrelated to the safety and soundness of the
underlying depository institution – all loans that were “sold promptly after origination.” 31
(After all, what greater assurance to the safety and soundness of a bank than getting a loan off

24

See id. at 12.

25

The paradigmatic “20% downpayment” was thus the result of government regulation, not a social thrift ethic.

26

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 304, 105 Stat. 2354
(1991). In the notice of final rulemaking for the uniform standards, the federal banking agencies rationalized:
The legislative history of section 304 indicates that Congress wanted to curtail
abusive real estate lending practices in order to reduce risk to the deposit insurance
funds and enhance the safety and soundness of insured depository
institutions. Congress considered placing explicit real estate lending restrictions in the
form of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limitations directly into the statute. Earlier versions of
the legislation included specific LTV limits. Ultimately, however, Section 304 was
enacted without LTV limits, or any other specific lending standards. Instead, Congress
mandated that the federal banking agencies adopt uniform regulations establishing real
estate lending standards without specifying what these standards should entail.
34).

Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg 62,890 (December 31, 1992) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.

27

Supra note 26 at 62,890.

28

Id. at 62,889.

29

Office of Thrift Supervision, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,978, §§ 560.100-101 (Sept. 30, 1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590).

30

Home Owners’ Loan Act, Pub. L. 101-73, Title III, § 301, 103 Stat. 277 (1989).

31

Supra note 26 at 62,896, 62,900.
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its books through prompt securitization? Who cares about those loans – what possible impact
could they have?) 32
Concomitant to this robust resurgence in caveat emptor starting in the 1980s was a rise
in abusive mortgage practices. This run-up in unscrupulous lending culminated in yet another
congressional intervention: the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. 33
HOEPA allows the Fed to regulate high-cost (i.e., subprime) mortgage loans. Thus its regulatory
panoply chiefly descends only upon loans that trip a high-cost trigger. For example, HOEPA
applies to refinancing loans (not purchase-money loans) only when the rate exceeds 10% above
the like-duration U.S. treasuries rate.34 HOEPA is of particular interest to examining DoddFrank’s ability to pay mandate because one of the duties HOEPA imposes upon lenders whose
loans trigger its scrutiny is analysis of an “ability to repay” – but only, as interpreted, for lenders
who are shown to have engaged in a “pattern or practice” of asset-based lending, i.e.,
originating loans based on (at best) collateral appraisals alone or (at worst) the incentive to
generate fees.35
HOEPA thus had some kick, but it was of limited effect. The Fed was only given
jurisdiction over lenders whose products triggered the high-cost loan threshold; 36 the OCC and
OTS continued to oversee their own depository institutions. Each did pass its own set of
regulations in 1996, but the regulatory thrust was perhaps not as expected. For example, OCC’s
big regulatory move was to confirm the permissibility of ARMs – and announce federal preemption of that decision over contrary ARM-banning state laws. 37 OTS in turn downgraded
many of its own regulations to “guideline” status, explaining almost apologetically regarding
the new guidelines to those by whom it was well captured: “OTS will continue to emphasize to

32

Compare Dodd-Frank at § 1413(k)(1) (augmenting assignee liability), 124 Stat. 2141.

33

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (1994), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (amending the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1649, by adding Section 129 to TILA).

34

Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (2010) (amended by Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (Truth in Lending, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,463 (March 24, 1995)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)) implementing HOEPA (Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 46,837 (Aug. 4, 2010) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)) (“The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) sets forth rules
for home-secured loans in which the total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before loan
consummation exceed the greater of $400 or 8 percent of the total loan amount. In keeping with the statute, the
Board has annually adjusted the $400 amount based on the annual percentage change reflected in the Consumer
Price Index as reported on June 1. The adjusted dollar amount for 2011 is $592.”).

35

Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 46,837 (Aug. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).

36

The scope of HOEPA was tinkered with over the years, but the big change came in 2008, contemporaneous with
the negotiation of Dodd-Frank, in which the Fed extended HOEPA’s reach to all mortgage originators under a new
national legal standard. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,526 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).

37

Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,294 (March 20, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 34) (final
rule).
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examiners that guidance documents should not be confused with regulations.” 38 Thus while
there were some regulatory stirrings, doubtless prompted in part by HOEPA, no meaningful
change to mortgage underwriting – or mortgage regulation – occurred during the 1990s.
By the turn of the millennium, however, the federal regulators took more active
notice. In June 2000, the Treasury Department/HUD issued a joint report on “Curbing
Predatory Home Mortgage Lending,” documenting the inadequate and gap-filled coverage of
TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA as statutory interventions for abusive mortgage lending.40 The joint
report recommended reforms, including, quite specifically, relaxing/repealing the restriction on
HOEPA’s asset-based lending ban to only “pattern or practice” lenders (in other words,
expanding the imposition of a duty to analyze borrower’s ability to repay). 41 Furthermore, the
OCC and OTS finally joined the Fed and the National Credit Union Administration to promulgate
a set of “Interagency Guidelines on Subprime Lending.” 42 (One suspects the pressure applied
by state regulators who led the charge, such as North Carolina, had made continued underactivity at the federal level implausible.) 43 In these new Subprime Lending Guidelines, the
39

38

Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 1,162, 1,163-64 (Jan. 17, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556,
560, 563, 571) (proposed rulemaking). Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (Sept. 30, 1996) 12 C.F.R. pts.
545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590 (final rule).
39

So did Congress. See, e.g., Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong., (July 26, 2001); Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services on Predatory Lending Practices, 106th Cong. 24-49 (May 24, 2000).
40

HUD-Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf. Many of the recommendations of this report, if followed,
may have mitigated or averted the housing market crisis.
41

Id. at 77-78. The Joint Report had numerous other recommendations, including working within the HOEPA
framework by changing its trigger threshold. See id. at 86-88.
42

Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006) (final
guidance). Note these guidelines were passed on an effective interim basis; the final version of the guidelines did
not pass until 2007. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249, 77,252
(Dec. 29, 2005) (proposed guidance). There were also earlier guidances touching on the issue, such as, e.g.,
Expanded Guidance for Evaluating Subprime Lending Programs, FDIC Press Release (January 31, 2001) available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html, which cautioned banks that originating unaffordable
loans would be viewed by supervising regulators as “imprudent.”
43

See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 24-1.1F(c)(1) (requiring ability to pay analysis of so-called “rate spread” loans). North
Carolina also was an earlier mover on anti-flipping laws. See id. at 24-10.2(c) (1999) (“No lender may knowingly or
intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of ‘flipping’ a consumer home loan. ‘Flipping’ a consumer loan is
the making of a consumer home loan to a borrower which refinances an existing consumer home loan when the
new loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances,
including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the borrower’s
circumstances. This provision shall apply regardless of whether the interest rate, points, fees, and charges paid or
payable by the borrower in connection with the refinancing exceed those thresholds specified in G.S. 241.1E(a)(6).”); see also Georgia Fair Lending Act, H.B. 1361 (2002) (prohibiting flipping within five years a new home
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regulators begrudgingly admitted that much mortgage lending in the subprime market was
abusive – although they still insisted it was a problem only to the extent it imperiled the safety
and soundness of regulated depository institutions. 44
Significantly, roughly contemporaneous with the drafting of the Subprime Lending
Guidelines, the OCC and OTS in 2003 for the first time embraced imposing a duty on lenders –
at least in the subprime market – to analyze borrower’s “ability to repay” mortgages.45 The
OCC’s “Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices” 46 and “Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Borrowed and Purchased
Loans,” 47 both cautioned banks against – but did not prohibit them from – issuing or buying
mortgages made without analyzing the borrower’s ability to pay. A year later, these cautions
ripened into regulations that explicitly prohibited mortgages issued without the lender
considering the borrower’s ability to pay.48
The scope of these anti-predatory mortgage rules, however, was limited, only applying
to depository institutions and their subsidiaries (but not, bafflingly, to their mortgageloan that does not provide “tangible net benefit to the borrower”); California Assembly Bill No. 489 (2001)
(requiring covered loan originators to consider the consumer’s ability to repay the loan. Macey et al. conclude in a
survey that “Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania all have at least some hint of [ability-to-pay
like ‘suitability’ requirements].” Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, Maureen O'Hara & Gabriel D. Rosenberg,
Helping Law Catch Up To Markets: Applying Broker-Dealer Law To Subprime Mortgage, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 832
(2009).
44

Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,250 (Dec. 29, 2005) (proposed
guidance) (“[O]ur concern is elevated with nontraditional products due to the lack of principal amortization and
potential accumulation of negative amortization. The Agencies are also concerned that these products and
practices are being offered to a wider spectrum of borrowers, including some who may not otherwise qualify
for traditional fixed-rate or other adjustable-rate mortgage loans, and who may not fully understand the
associated risks.”).
45

The FTC also determined subprime loans made knowing debtors cannot repay are unfair and deceptive. See
Ronald G. Isaac, Assistant to the Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection,
before the California State Assembly Committee on Banking and Finance on Predatory Lending Practices in the
Home-Equity Lending Market (Feb. 21, 2001) (prepared statement available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v010002.shtm) (cataloguing enforcement efforts over several years that included a
settlement with national subprime lender engaged in asset-based lending).
46

Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices, OCC Advisory Letter
2003-2 (Feb 21, 2003) 7, available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisoryletters/2003/advisory-letter-2003-2.pdf.
47

Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Borrowed and Purchased Loans, OCC Advisory Letter 20033, (Feb. 21, 2003) available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2003/advisoryletter-2003-3.pdf.
48

Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
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originating affiliates – although they too eventually came under their reach). 49 Moreover, they
were promulgated in conjunction with a pre-emption decision of state predatory lending laws,
some of which were quite expansive in their protection of mortgage borrowers, and so the net
regulatory effect was unclear (i.e., the trade-off between widening the scope of federal
protection but voiding state protections was uncertain). 50 Certainly the relaxation in credit by
macroeconomic policy following the early 2000s tech-bubble correction provided counterpressure to attempts to rein in mortgage credit. Thus while the mid-2000s saw the first
emergence of an “ability to pay” duty imposed on mortgage lenders through regulation, it
seems to have been a half-hearted effort of considerable foot-dragging. 51 For example, the
decision to omit the clearly mortgage-dominated “affiliates” of banks and thrifts until 2006
from subprime mortgage lending regulations is difficult to explain away as regulatory caution;
the more likely narrative of a reluctant regulator has been noted even by the popular press. 52
(Anyone skeptical of a cynical account of regulatory capture by these federal mortgage
overseers should consider that Countrywide’s decision to relinquish its bank charter so it could
relocate its regulatory oversight to the OTS from the OCC was quite candidly explained as
driven by the OTS’s wisdom to interpret the Subprime Lending Guidelines with more
“restraint.”) 53
Finally, in the grand tradition of belated government regulatory action to crisis, only in
2008 after the housing collapse was well afoot did the Fed amend TILA’s Regulation Z to ban
high-cost HOEPA-esque loans (defined as ones with rates over prime plus 1.5% for first liens)
made without the lender analyzing the borrower’s ability to pay and verifying income and
assets. 54 The 2008 Regulation Z amendment was significant because, even though limited to
high-cost mortgages that tripped its HOEPA-like trigger, it was not restricted to specific covered
entities (such as depository institutions or their affiliates). 55 All mortgage lenders fell under its
scope. (Since the amendments did not come into force until October 1, 2009, however, they of
course had no appreciable impact on the housing market collapse.) 56
49

Id. at 1905 (final rule applies to “national banks and their operating subsidiaries”); Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,610, n. 3, (Oct. 4, 2006).
50

Id. at 1908-11.

51

See, e.g., DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 101 (“Enforcement actions have, however, rarely been brought [by federal
banking regulators] for originating or purchasing loans without regard to ability to repay.”).

52

Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/business/18subprime.html.
53

Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM. BANKER, November 10, 2006, at 1.

54

Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,523 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (July 30, 2008).

55

In fact, some amendments applied not just to all mortgage lenders but all residential mortgages (not just highcost ones), such as, e.g., the proscription against coercing real estate appraisers to inflate valuations). See Truth in
Lending, supra note 36, at 44,522-23.
56

Opponents to Dodd-Frank predictably claimed that the Regulation Z amendments should be allowed time to
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Understandably, Dodd-Frank’s 2010 injunction on all mortgage originators – of all
mortgages – to consider a borrower’s ability to repay the loan was a watershed.57 Not only did
it cut through the crazy-quilt of OCC, OTS, the Fed, and others by casting a uniform statutory
duty on all mortgage lenders, it applied for the first time to all mortgage loans – having seen
the contagion from the subprime market to the Alt-A market and beyond – a duty irrespective

take effect before Congress “rush” to statutory intervention. “Last July, the Federal Reserve issued new
regulations under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act . . . . As part of this implementation, new
Federal rules have been developed which address predatory practices and products . . . . But rather than allowing
the Fed’s carefully constructed regulations to take effect, this new majority has decided to draft their own
mortgage reform bill with their own unique twist. Unfortunately, this twist includes new and untested mandates
and duties, that even if they can be implemented, they may end up punishing the very consumers that this
majority party is trying to protect.” 111 Cong. Rec. H5175, H5177 (2009) (Remarks of Rep. Sessions), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-05-06/pdf/CREC-2009-05-06-pt1-PgH5174-3.pdf.
57

States appeared ahead of this regulatory curve. Minnesota, for example, passed a statute requiring analysis of
ability to pay (and verification of income) of all loans. See 2007 Minn. Sess. Laws Ch. 18, §58.13(1)(a)(23).
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of a complex (not to mention easily evaded) jurisdictional trigger. 58 “Ability to pay” had been
adopted whole hog.59
C. Suitability? Analogues Outside the Mortgage Regulation World
Reviewing the fitful development of the ability to pay duty might suggest that it was a
foreign concept to American law. That is not true. The requirement to gauge a borrower’s
ability to pay is in fact similarly spirited to “suitability” requirements found in securities
regulation (and other areas). 60 Broker-dealers, even when not full-fledged fiduciary investment
58

Note the jurisdictional trigger survives today embedded within Dodd-Frank’s definition of “qualified mortgages.”
See Dodd-Frank at 2145-50, discussed in Part II, infra. HEOPA has had a tumultuous enforcement history. For
example, in 2001, the Fed amended TILA to address consumer advocates’ complaints that creditors were
structuring high-cost loans as open-ended home equity lines expressly to evade HOEPA requirements. See Truth in
Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,614-15 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (“[Section] 226.34(b)
explicitly prohibits structuring a mortgage loan as an open-end credit line to evade HOEPA’s requirements, if the
loan does not meet the TILA definition of open-end credit . . . . Where a loan is documented as open-end credit
but the features and terms or other circumstances demonstrate that it does not meet the definition of open-end
credit, the loan is subject to the rules for closed-end credit, including HOEPA if the rate or fee trigger is met”). Still,
the charge that HOEPA’s triggers were too easily evaded remained:
Unfortunately, at the same time, HOEPA has had little success in eliminating those
abusive practices it identifies. As consumer advocates have been arguing for years, HOEPA’s
points and fees triggers are simply too high. As a result, very few subprime loans – less than one
percent in 1999 – fall within HOEPA’s points and fees trigger and are subject to regulation.
Predatory lenders have successfully managed to conduct the bulk of their abusive activities using
rates just below the HOEPA triggers but still high enough to provide enormous room for
exploitation and profitability.
Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case For States as Laboratories of Experimentation,
57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 355-56 (2005); see also Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 59 (2005) (bemoaning that HOEPA failed to prevent “most abusive
costs associated with predatory mortgages” and offering example that “mortgage lenders commonly exclude yield
spread premiums from calculation of the HOEPA points and fees trigger”).
59

The all-encompassing reach of Dodd-Frank renders the continued relevance of HOEPA’s triggers unclear. That is,
if only high-cost loans fall under HOEPA’s purview, but all loans are now subject to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay
duty, then at least that aspect of HOEPA is redundant. Bizarrely, Dodd-Frank itself amended parts of HOEPA’s
(seemingly redundant) high-cost loan definitional triggers. At a recent conference on consumer enforcement
under Dodd-Frank, I asked a regulator about this (off-record) and was met with the worldly response that yes,
Dodd-Frank did reveal some legislative inelegance and redundancy.
60

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 requires insurance products to be “suitable and appropriate for the
consumer.”) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999), Subtitle C, 113 Stat. 1422-24. The act requires a
majority of states to enact reciprocal laws or uniform laws governing the licensure of individuals and entities
authorized to sell and solicit insurance no later than three years after the act was enacted. States satisfy the
uniformity requirement when they “establish uniform criteria to ensure that an insurance product . . . sold to a
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advisers, owe their clients a duty to recommend only “suitable” investments, mindful of the
client’s particular circumstances. 61
This suitability burden has a long pedigree, tracing back to the 1930s. The Maloney Act
of 1938 charged the SEC to register self-regulating securities agencies, such as the NASD, in
order “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.” 62 NASD Rule 2310, passed
in 1939, in turn imposes a duty regarding non-institutional clients to obtain information on the
customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and “such other information used
or considered to be reasonable by a [broker-dealer] in making recommendations to a
customer.” 63 (Thus were born the check-boxes we enjoy when opening a brokerage account.)
Other kindred entities followed suit; the NYSE’s Rule 405, while not explicitly cast as a suitability
rule, is referred to as the “Know Thy Customer Rule,” and has been interpreted to require a
suitability analysis. 64
The SEC itself has not explicitly passed a suitability rule, although its practices have been
to read one into its general anti-fraud proscription and its broad injunction of “fair dealing.” 65

consumer is suitable and appropriate for the consumer.” If after three years a majority of states failed to enact
uniform or reciprocal licensing laws, then the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers would have
been established to carry out multi-state licensing, but a majority did so enact so this nationalizing threat never
realized. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Producer Licensing Assessment Aggregate
Report of Findings (Feb. 19, 2008) 2, available at
www.naic.org/Releases/.../producer_licensing_assessment_report.pdf.
61

See Hirsch, supra note 12, at 21-24 (“Suitability is a concept recognized in the securities law that imposes a duty
on a securities broker to sell only securities to a buyer that are ‘suitable’ for the buyer based on the buyer’s
financial wherewithal, tax status, investment objectives and other factors.”). The suitability obligation is only
triggered when the securities broker-dealer recommends a specific purchase; the obligation is not present when
the broker is given an order of self-directed trading. Id., at 26-27, 29. Some have argued, however, that the duty
should expand to encompass brokers acting in any capacity given the implicit expectations of clients. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439 (2010).
62

Maloney Act, Pub. L. 75–719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78o, authorizing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to register national securities associations).
63

NASD Conduct Rule 2310 (formerly Article III, Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice).

64

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Finra), Regulatory Notice 09-25, Suitability and “Know Your Customer”
Proposed Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Suitability and Know-Your-Customer Obligations, (May 2009), at n.
5, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p118709.pdf.
65

SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm.
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Relatedly, the SEC has, with a few exceptions, 66 eschewed direct ex ante regulation in favor of
case-by-case adjudication that delineates this suitability standard incrementally. 67 Moreover,
the case-by-case adjudication of suitability does not even occur at the SEC; it actually occurs
primarily through NASD self-discipline (i.e., FINRA arbitrations), 68 albeit with occasional SEC
direct enforcement against wayward broker-dealers. 69 A private right of action for suitability is
also implied under the securities law but has not been known to generate landmark awards. 70
Accordingly, although the SEC’s suitability standard has not been elaborated through
regulation, it has developed over time with a rich interpretative history. Not only has that
history shown the content of the standard but also its deep-seated paternalism. Consider, for
example, that it has been determined to be no defense to a suitability violation to plead
disclosure; unsuitable investment recommendations are categorically prohibited, regardless of
what the broker tells the client.71 This paternalism reveals that while suitability is most
66

Those few exceptions included the SECO Rule for Non-NASD brokers that governed before mandatory
registration was passed in 1983, which required “reasonable grounds to believe … [a] recommendation is not
unsuitable for such customer,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3, as well as Rule 15c2-5 on margin trading, see id. at §
240.15c2-5. The SEC does have what might be considered “indirect” ex ante suitability regulations, such as the
categorical exclusionary effects of the accredited investor rules of Regulation D, see id. at § 230.501, §§ 230.505506, and more specifically Rule 15g-9’s restrictions on trading in penny stocks, see id. at § 240.15g-9,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51983.pdf, but for the most part has declined promulgating direct ex ante rules
squarely on topic.
67

See Macey et al., infra note 43, at 839.

68

FINRA, Arbitration & Mediation Rules, available at http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Rules. Suitability
violation is actually pled quite frequently in arbitration claims. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and Adam C.
Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEG. STUD. 109, 123 (2010) (finding suitability violations pled in 49.76% of
arbitrations). For a cogent analysis of the business costs of suitability monitoring, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 95-98.

69

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, § 10(b) (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958); see also, e.g., SEC v.
Ainsworth, No. EDCV 08-1350 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (SEC suit against group of securities brokers alleging they
sold unsuitable securities to customers with little formal education, did not speak English fluently, and lacked
funds necessary to purchase the securities recommended by defendants absent refinancing).

70

See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 817 (2009) (“SEC and federal courts have found broker-dealers personally
liable for suitability violations under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, under which
private rights of action are implied.”); cf. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209,
1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a party has no private right of action against an exchange for violating its own rules);
Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that SRO suitability rules do not create a
private right of action); Katheleen Engel and Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.R. 1255, 1316, 1338-39 (2002) (describing how “low and uncertain damage awards”
reduce the number of suitability cases and that punitive damage awards are capped at $11,000 under FHA limits).
71

See In re Stein, S.E.C. Release No. 47335, 79 SEC Docket 1777 (Feb. 11, 2003), 2003 WL 431870, at 2 (“Registered
representative does not satisfy the suitability requirement simply by disclosing the risk of an investment that he or
she has recommended.”).
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avowedly not a fiduciary duty, it is, like a duty to analyze ability to repay, a strong abrogation of
caveat emptor.
Given this lengthy history of usage in the securities arena, it is perhaps not surprising
this quasi-fiduciary concept of suitability was on the minds of many leading up to the passage of
Dodd-Frank. Indeed, one of Dodd-Frank’s precursors, the would-be Borrower’s Protection Act
of 2007, went so far as to propose that “[i]n the case of a home mortgage loan, the mortgage
brokers shall have a fiduciary relationship with the consumer, and each such mortgage broker
shall be subject to all requirements for fiduciaries otherwise applicable under State or Federal
law.” 72 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (that mostly found its
way into Title XIV of Dodd-Frank) ended up taking a more modest approach, avoiding the
contentious concept of suitability and instead suggesting tweaks to the “high-cost loan” trigger
for HOEPA in order to expand its regulatory reach over problematic mortgages. 73 Expressly
bowing to the charged nature of suitability and not wanting a fight, sponsor Rep. Frank assured,
“We felt a suitability standard was too vague. . . . We don’t want to give people an obligation
that is too vague and obscure because you can scare people away from doing anything. We
think these [proposals] are less subjective than suitability.” 74
Similarly, the Final Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending from 2007 (implementing
the Subprime Lending Guidelines, discussed above) made clear that while the participating
agencies were passing specific regulations proscribing certain lending practices, 75 they were
most unequivocally not going to embrace suitability:
The Agencies disagree with the commentators who expressed
concern that the proposed statement appears to establish a suitability
standard under which lenders would be required to assist borrowers in
choosing products that are appropriate to their needs and circumstances.
The commentators argued that lenders are not in a position to determine
which products are most suitable for borrowers, and that this decision
should be left to borrowers themselves. It is not the Agencies’ intent to
impose such a standard, nor is there any language in the Statement that
does so.76
72

Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007, S. 1299 § 2, 110th Cong. (2007).

73

See Dodd-Frank, 124. Stat. 2157-60, § 1431. Note these HOEPA-altering provisions remained in the law. See
also Legislative Proposals on Reforming Mortgage Practices: Hearing on H.R. 3915 Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm.,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Marc Savitt, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers) (discussing
suitability).

74

Binyamin Appelbaum, Frank’s Bill Seeks Rules for Lenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2007, at D1 (quoting
Representative Barney Frank), available at
http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2007/10/23/franks_bill_seeks_rules_for_lenders/.
75

Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 10, 2007).

76

Id. at 37,572.
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The final pre-enactment draft of Dodd-Frank, while eschewing suitability outright, did
get close. In addition to shouldering lenders with the affirmative duty to analyze ability to
repay that is the subject of this article, it even sought to propose a specific “net tangible
benefit” test for refinancing loans (building on the plausible theory that loans saddled on
debtors who cannot repay them confer no actual benefit). 77 While this net tangible benefit
requirement was left on the cutting room floor to ensure passage at the last minute, the
surviving ability to pay requirement captures most if not all of the content of that rule. (Some
have argued that suitability and ability to pay are wholly different concepts, 78 but that is
debatable.) 79
Thus it was not just the regulatory trial balloons in the 1990s and beyond in the
mortgage oversight realm that gave rise to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay analysis duty,
securities law played a rich parallel role too.80

77

See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. sec. 202, § 129B(b)(1)(b)(3). (“No creditor may extend credit in connection with any residential mortgage loan that involves a
refinancing of a prior existing residential mortgage loan unless the creditor reasonably and in good faith
determines, at the time the loan is consummated and on the basis of information known by or obtained in good
faith by the creditor, that the refinanced loan will provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer.”), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr3915eh/pdf/BILLS-110hr3915eh.pdf. The net tangible benefit
requirement persists at state law. See supra note 43.
78

See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 832, 836-37 (borrower’s ability to repay is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of suitability). Bankers’ lobbyists fear both. See Duncan, supra note 21, at 127 (opposing ability to pay
rules as “too prescriptive”) and 140 (opposing suitability standards as “too subjective”).
79

To be sure, the latter is technically a constitutive factor of the former, but it in the context of a residential
mortgage it is surely the lion’s share of the relevant consideration: requiring lenders to consider a borrower’s
ability to repay creates enough quasi-fiduciary obligation that the marginal imposition of, say, an additional
assessment of the suitability of a fixed or adjustable-rate mortgage (both of which have already been found
affordable) seems negligible. This conclusion does not lead me to advocate a suitability standard but rather simply
to point out that I think much if not most of the normative goal has been achieved through ability to pay.
80

Interestingly, some creative litigants have sought to advance suitability duties for mortgage brokers by extending
state unfair/abusive practices laws. See, e.g., Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp., 2007 WL 2572362; Tingley v.
Beazer Homes Corp. (D. N.J. Sept. 4, 2007), 2008 WL 1902108 (D. N.C. April 25, 2008).
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D. Foreign Cognates
A duty to consider ability to pay, while perhaps late-coming to the American scene, has
existed in other countries’ laws for some time. France, for example, has prohibited banks to
advise borrowers to assume more debt than they can repay, and even has a quite specific 33%
debt service cap on disposable income.81 Denmark, which has been singled out for praise by
the IMF for its stable mortgage market regulation, passed a 2003 Mortgage-Credit Loans and
Mortgage-Credit Bonds Act, capping residential, owner-occupied mortgages at 80% LTV.82
Others too have been galvanized by the mortgage crisis. For example, the Canadians in
October 2008 changed minimum standards for government-backed mortgages (mortgages with
less than 20% down-payments, for which the government mandates mortgage insurance) to
impose upon the lender a “reasonable effort to verify that the borrower can afford the loan
payment.” 83 (In February 2010, the permissible principal amount a homeowner can take out in
refinancing such a mortgage was lowered from 95% to 90%.) 84 In the most populous province
of Ontario, moreover, provincial regulators went even further and in 2008 adopted an express
suitability standard for mortgage brokers, which requires consideration of “the needs and
circumstances of the borrower,” as well as the implementation of procedures and practices to
ensure “the suitability of a mortgage . . . for a borrower.” 85
81

The French Model: Vive la différence! The French Way of Doing Things Looks Pretty Good—at Least in These
Troubled EconomicTtimes, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.economist.com/node/13610197.
82

Mortgage-Credit Loans and Mortgage-Credit Bonds Act, unofficial English translation (2003), § 5(1), available at
http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/upload/Finanstilsynet/Mediafiles/newdoc/Acts/Act454_100603H.pdf. Denmark
used to be the darling of mortgage regulation analysts by having MBS’s comply with its famous “balance principle,”
which required matching the underlying mortgage security dates to the term of the securities issues. See
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DENMARK: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM – TECHNICAL NOTE – THE DANISH
MORTGAGE MARKET – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 5 (2007). To comply with the EU Capital Requirement Directive,
however, Denmark passed a revised mortgage act in 2007, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and
Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement – Denmark, (April 2011),
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157267.htm, which gave lenders the option to choose compliance
with the existing specific pass-through balance principle or a more general, “flexible” balance principle that
essentially vitiated the strict coverage requirement. Harmonization enthusiasts should be careful what they wish
for. For a detailed analysis of the differences between these two specific and general balance principles, see
Realkreditradet, Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, General and Specific Balance Principle,
http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Danish_Mortgage_Model/General_and_specific_balance_principle.aspx.
83

Press Release, Annette Robertson, Press Secretary, Office of the Minister of Finance, Government of Canada
Takes Action to Strengthen Housing Financing – Backgrounder, (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/n10/data/10-011_1-eng.asp.
84

Id.

85

Ontario Regulation 188/08, enacted pursuant to Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act, 2006, §
24, available at http://www.eaws.gov.on.ca/html/source/regs/english/2008/elaws_src_regs_r08188_e.htm#BK29.
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Australia went beyond a mere duty to analyze ability to repay to an even broader
affirmative duty of “responsible lending” in its National Consumer Credit Protection Act of
2009. 86 Such duty includes within it an obligation to assess “whether the credit contract will be
unsuitable for the consumer if the contract is entered or the credit limit increased.” 87
Australia’s suitability duty expressly requires consideration of the likelihood the consumer will
be unable to comply with the financial obligations of the contract or whether compliance will
engender “substantial hardship” on the consumer. 88
Australia’s invocation of a duty of “responsible lending” implicates a hotly contested
policy debate that has been brewing in Europe for some time. There, several civil jurisdictions
place fiduciary-like responsibility squarely on lenders. For example, Germany recognizes
“sittenwidrige Uberschulduing” (immoral overburdening with debts) in its domestic law, 89 and
Sweden’s Consumer Credit and Banking Act bans the extension of credit to borrowers who
cannot be expected to repay (allowing a private remedy of “debt adjustment” by the borrower
for violation). 90 These strong consumer protections by way of saddling arms-length lenders
with affirmative duties to consider the needs of others helped ground a movement at the
European Union level to revise its Consumer Credit Directive to impose upon member states
standardized policies of policing lending practices. 91 (This project ultimately ended up
excluding mortgage products from its scope, but they in turn faced their own regulation,
discussed below.)
The initial proposed EU Consumer Credit Directive, floated in 2002, had a “responsible
lending” section that contained an obligation to gauge a debtor’s ability to repay.92 But this
concept met marked opposition from the United Kingdom, which in commentary expressed
“doubts about the value of a ‘responsible lending’ provision.” 93 Consequently, the next draft in
2005 whittled down this duty to become one of only “advising” and “providing adequate
86

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Austl.) available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2009A00134.
87

Id. at Chapter 3, Part 3-1, Division 4, § 116(1)(b), Chapter 3, part 3-2, Division 3, § 129(b).

88

Id. at Chapter 3, Part 3-1, Division 4, § 118(2)(a), Chapter 3, part 3-2, Division 3, § 131(2)(a).

89

See Udo Reifner et al., CONSUMER OVERINDENTEDNESS AND CONSUMER LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 100-01 (2003).

90

Id. at 100.

91

See Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements
for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/Result.do?T1=V3&T2=2008&T3=48&RechType=RECH_naturel&Submit=Search.
92

See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers, at 15-6, 40, COM
(2002) 443 final (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0443:FIN:EN:PDF.

93

Dep’t Trade & Indus., PROPOSAL FOR AN EC CONSUMER CREDIT DIRECTIVE – SUPPLEMENTARY CONSULTATION 5, 13 (2006),
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27459.pdf.
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information,” 94 with an explicit admonition that the borrower bears ultimate responsibility of
deciding what credit is appropriate. 95 When the credit collapse hit, however, the UK’s
resistance to burdening lenders with unfair duties lost punch; the final version of the directive,
as enacted in 2008, while employing vaguer language than the initial draft, unquestionably
shifts most responsibility back to the lender: “Member states should take appropriate measures
to promote responsible lending practices . . . .” 96 Expanding, the directive chides: “It is
important that creditors should not engage in irresponsible lending or give out credit without
prior assessment of creditworthiness . . . .” 97
In March 2011, the European Commission followed up on the Consumer Credit Directive
with its carved-out proposal for a Directive on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential
Property. 98 The proposal “requires the creditor to assess the consumer’s ability to repay the
credit,” clarifying that if the “consumer’s creditworthiness results in a negative prospect for his
ability to repay the credit over the lifetime of the credit agreement” the creditor must refuse
credit.99 This mortgage lending proposal builds upon the practices of many member states. A
2009 Public Consultation, for example, catalogues how Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland,
Malta, and the Netherlands already require suitability assessments of mortgage products based
on the consumer’s personal circumstances. 100 The proposed mortgage directive, however, is at
once both expansive and vague. In terms of the scope of ability to pay, it capaciously counsels
considering “all necessary factors that could influence a consumer’s ability to repay . . .
including, but not limited to, the consumer’s income, regular expenditures, credit score, past
credit history, ability to handle interest rate adjustments, and other existing credit
commitments.” 101 It further demands acquisition of “necessary information regarding the

94

See Modified Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Agreements for
Consumers Amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, at 2, 6, 31, COM (2005) 483 final (Oct. 7, 2005) (stating that it is
only necessary to consult databases “where appropriate”), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/fina_serv/cons_directive/2ndproposal_en.pdf.

95

Id. at 6.

96

See Directive, supra note 91, at § 26.

97

Id.

98

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON CREDIT AGREEMENTS

RELATING TO RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY (March 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-

retail/docs/credit/mortgage/com_2011_142_en.pdf.
99

Id. at 11, 35. Article 5(1) mandates that credit providers act “in accordance with the best interests of the
consumer,” which sounds fiduciary. Id. at art. 5(1).
100

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON RESPONSIBLE LENDING AND BORROWING IN THE EU, 7 FN 17 (June 2009)
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/responsible_lending/consultation_en.pdf.

101

PROPOSAL, supra note 98, at Preamble, para. 24. It further requires
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consumer’s personal and financial situation, his preferences and objectives.” 102 On the other
hand, whether that translates into specific rules is left up to each country: “Member States may
issue guidance on the method and criteria to asses a consumer’s creditworthiness, for example
by setting limits on loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios.” 103 Furthermore, a suitability-like
duty arisees in a provision that requires the lender to “identify products that are not unsuitable
for the consumer given his needs, financial situation and personal circumstances.” 104
The Europeans thus have not only had suitability (and even fiduciary duties) imposed on
their lenders for some time, they are clearly strengthening and expanding those duties in EUwide responses to the economic crisis. Indeed, even previous holdout the UK has apparently
had second thoughts on the efficacy of market discipline alone. In an FSA Discussion Paper of
2009 of Mortgage Market Review, an “Affordability Assessment Model” was put forward to
require lenders to assure credit be extended only to homeowners who could afford
repayment. 105 The Model further imposes an obligation to verify affordability by calculating the
borrower’s “free disposable income” that is available for debt service. 106 FSA backed off,
however, from suggestions for more rule-based limits, such as a hard LTV cap or debt-toincome (“DTI”) cap on residential mortgage loans. 107 FSA’s Mortgage Market Review of 2010
confirmed this affordability approach and even considered stricter rules for “credit impaired”
borrowers, such as a 20% “buffer” in calculating free disposable income. 108
102

Id. at art. 14(4); see also id. at art. 17(b) (requiring gathering of “necessary information” on “personal and
financial situation, preferences and objectives so as to enable recommendation of suitable credit agreements”).
Article 17(a) even mandates lenders to consider a “sufficiently large number of credit arrangements.” Id. at art.
17(a).
103

Id. at Preamble, para. 24.

104

Id. at art. 14(5). The Proposal implements the suggestion of the 2010 Working Paper preceding the proposal
that “the creditor . . . should thoroughly assess the suitability of credit contracts for the consumer’s personal and
financial circumstances on the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate obtained from the consumer.”
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER ON RESPONSIBLE MORTGAGE LENDING AND BORROWING 9 (July 2010) available at
http://www.fininc.eu/gallery/documents/efin-news/work-paper-resp-lending-2010-07-22.pdf. Unlike “hard”
suitability under US securities law, however, the Working Paper envisions an insistent consumer being able to
proceed with an unsuitable credit contract after express disclosure, warning, and written waiver – waiveable
(“soft”) suitability, but suitability nonetheless. Id. at 8-9. The Proposal seems to have shut this down. See
PROPOSAL, supra note 98, at art. 29(1) (“[C]onsumers may not waive the rights conferred on them by . . . this
Directive.”).
105

FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION PAPER 09/3 MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW 51 (October 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/DP/2009/09_03.shtml.

106

Id. at 12.

107

Id. at 11, 37.

108

FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/16 MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW 9, 28 (2010), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/CP/2010/10_16.shtml.
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Finally, quick mention should be made in discussing other jurisdictions’ approaches to
mortgage market regulation to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Because the
mortgage meltdown had global systemic ramifications, Basel too became involved in offering
recommendations for banks. 109 Minimum underwriting standards, including repayment
capacity analysis, effective income verification, and “appropriate” LTVs, have all been included
in Basel’s suggestions, although with nowhere close to the specificity found in many domestic
proposals. 110
This brief comparative law overview shows how some countries have had ability to pay,
suitability, and even full-throated responsible lending duties imposed upon mortgage credit
providers for some time. 111 It also shows a convergence of concepts and terminology. The
panic-inducing collapse of global mortgage markets may well have herded countries toward a
harmonizing regulatory path, where a duty to ensure ability to repay no longer seems
innovative but commonplace. While it would likely be overstatement to contend that we are
witnessing the emergence of a harmonized global standard, it is fair to observe that what
seems like a shocking innovation to U.S. consumer law may be nothing more the U.S. catching
up (some would argue being led astray) to where most other developed mortgage markets
already are.
E. Academic Support
Finally, just as Elizabeth Warren agitated for a consumer financial protection agency for
some time,112 so too have academics been keeping the pressure on for some form of suitability
or similar duty on mortgage lenders. Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy (the latter of whom is
now tapped to run one of the CFPB’s mortgages unit) 113 win the salience award for their 2002
Texas Law Review article, in which they propose “a duty of suitability in subprime mortgage
lending.” 114 Making their case, Engel and McCoy “draw upon suitability in securities and
insurance” to explain that the “new duty of suitability puts the onus of preventing predatory
lending on those who can afford it most cheaply (i.e., predatory lenders and brokers) by
authorizing the federal government and aggrieved victims to sue for loan reformation,
109

JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION – KEY ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint24.htm.
110

Id. at 15-7.

111

Some countries have even broader consumer protection laws that are so protective that suitability would
appear subsumed. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, 2008, Republic of South Africa, Part G (“Right to fair, just
and reasonable terms and conditions”).
112

See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8 (2007), available at
www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf.

113

Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center, Treasury Department Announces Senior Hires for
CFPB Implementation Team (Feb. 17 2011) (McCoy hired as Assistant Director for Mortgage and Home Equity
Markets), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1070.aspx.
114

See Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1259.
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disgorgement, and damages.” 115 (Note that even Engel and McCoy were not so bold as to
suggest blanket application of suitability to the entire mortgage market – as Dodd-Frank does –
just to the subprime market; it is amazing what an intervening global economic collapse will
do.) Their focus on private remedies to enforce newly placed duties on lenders mirrored other
agitants’ cries that demanded more dramatic remedies to combat the “reckless lending”
infecting the consumer credit markets.116
Engel and McCoy were not alone. Daniel Ehrenberg also advocated suitability,
borrowing more directly from securities law. 117 Some even made the argument that suitability
could (and should) be attached under current securities law, under the theory that mortgage
sales could be seen as transactions “in connection with” purchase and sale of securities. 118 In
addition to like-minded supporters, there were also the critics, such as Todd Zywicki and Jack
Guttentag, the latter of whom snorted, “Nobody makes loans known to be unaffordable at the
outset except collateral lenders . . . and perpetrators of fraud.” 119 One of the more bizarre
critiques came from Anthony Yezer, who protested that a suitability standard would be tough
for the average bank because loan officers would need to have committed to memory
hundreds of their products to discharge this duty effectively. 120 (Even leaving aside the
likelihood that a broker-dealer surely needs familiarity with a similar number of investment
products to discharge his suitability duty, and the fact that securities law has not collapsed
under the weight of such a rule, one is left wondering just how non-repeat mortgage borrowers
would be better situated to memorize such offerings than their loan officers.) 121 Finally,
115

Id.

116

Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 17–18
(1975); see also John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 408.
117

Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn’t Fit, Don’t Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage
Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10-WTR J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. L. 117, 125-27
(2001).
118

See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 792, at 809, 813 (arguing, inter alia, a subprime mortgage might a “note” for
securities law purpose (and not a mere “debt”) under the Reves test because “we believe that some mortgages
have crossed the line between financial vehicles used to finance personal consumption (which are not securities)
and financial instruments with significant investment components that should be categorized as notes regardless
of the fact that there is a consumption component involved”).
119

Jack Guttentag, Suitability Standards Could Carry Unintended Consequences, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2007),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033001016.html; see
also, e.g., Todd Zywicki and Joseph Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 78
(2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106907.
120

See Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Hous., Transp.
and Community Dev. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 5 (2007) (written
testimony by Professor Anthony M. Yezer, George Washington University), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=827e024e-707e-4edbb4b5-ffa285d19982&Witness_ID=877fac70-cca2-42e6-bf27-0f94c336e054.
121

Engel and McCoy also noted the inherent regressivity of such an argument, pointing out that because
“suitability is appropriate for financial instruments that have been the traditional province of the affluent, certainly
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Richard Posner contributed his requisite chime-in, arguably signaling conclusion of the
intellectual discussion. 122 Thus, Dodd-Frank’s ability to repay duty can be seen not just as the
output of gradual change working its way through the field of extant U.S. mortgage regulations
(coupled with the unprecedented housing market collapse), but as the product of a
convergence of intellectual pressure from domestic regulators, state legal entrepreneurs (like
North Carolina), 123 non-mortgage regulators in the securities field, foreign jurisdictions, and
academic commentators.
II:

Analysis: What Will It Actually Look Like?

Dodd-Frank offers remarkable specificity in many aspects. Consider, for example, the
highly detailed timeline setting deadlines for the passage of specific regulations.124 By contrast,
there is little guidance in the statute on just how this landmark duty to analyze ability to pay
should be enforced. For example, in the United Kingdom, regulators expressed serious
reservation about the “inflexibility” of imposing strict caps on LTV and DTI to bar certain types
of loans. 125 On the other hand, within the HOEPA framework, there is ready willingness to set
very specific numerical rules, right down to the jurisdictional trigger. 126 How should we read
between the statutory lines with Dodd-Frank? For instance, is the expansion of the duty to
analyze ability to pay to all loans (rather than just high-cost ones) an implicit decision that
Congress wants the reach of regulation to be as broad as possible?
it is appropriate for financial instruments that are peddled to the poorest rung of society.” Engel & McCoy, supra
note 70, at 1319.
122

Richard A. Posner, Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2009), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574302213213148166.html.

123

This article has avoided an extensive survey of state laws, other than a brief comment, supra, at note 43. For a
good discussion of state-level innovations, see Hirsch, supra note 12, at 30-33 (describing, e.g., Colorado as
imposing a “quasi-fiduciary duty” on mortgage brokers). See also Engel & McCoy, supra note 70 at 1299-1305
(discussing state law remedies for predatory lending).
124

See Dodd-Frank at 2136, § 1400(c) (regulations under Title XIV become effective twelve months after the Board
issues final regulations and guidelines and the Act requires the Board to issue final regulations within eighteen
months after the transfer date); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252-53, (Sept. 20, 2010) (transfer date is July 21, 2011,
when ‘‘ ‘consumer financial protection functions’ currently carried out by the Federal banking agencies, as well as
certain authorities currently carried out by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal
Trade Commission, will be transferred to the CFPB”); Dodd-Frank at 2148, §1412(3)(ii) (HUD, Dept. of Agriculture,
Dept. of Veterans Affairs and the Rural Housing Service shall in consultation with the [Federal Reserve] Board
prescribe rules defining the types of loans they insure, guarantee or administer that are qualified mortgages for
the purposes of the safe harbor provision). On the transfer date, “consumer financial protection functions” carried
out by Federal banking agencies, HUD and FTC will be transferred to CFPB; specifically CFPB will “assume
responsibility for consumer compliance supervision of very large depository institutions and their affiliates and
promulgating regulations under various Federal consumer financial laws” and “take steps to implement the riskbased supervision of nondepository covered persons.” 75 Fed. Reg. 57,253.

125

See supra note 107.

126

See supra note 34; see also Dodd-Frank at 2146-47, §1412(2)(c), 124 Stat. 2157-60, §1431.
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A. Legislative Guidance
The relevant commands of the statute itself are intriguing in this respect. They begin
with a standard-like injunction of barring loans that are underwritten without analyzing the
borrower’s ability to repay. 127 This broad exhortation is followed by a statutory list of
mandated factors to consider, which includes the “consumer’s credit history, current income,
expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-toincome ratio or the residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt
and mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other than
the consumer’s equity in the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan.” 128
This is a comprehensive-sounding list, to be sure, but one that actually requires no specific
weighting of any of its constitutive elements. Moreover, the statutory specificity continues
even down to the next level of implementation, where the duty to verify income is in turn
micromanaged regarding which documents to requisition: W-2s, tax returns, payroll receipts,
etc. 129 Countless other examples abound of this statute-level detail, such as how to account
properly for an ARM or non-fully amortizing loan in working the ability to repay analysis. 130
Perhaps most significantly, the statute also provides a specific presumption to interpret
the ability to repay, in a section captioned, “Safe Harbor and Rebuttable Presumption.” Section
1412 amends (as amended!) TILA section 129C after subsection (a) with a new subsection (b):
(b) Presumption of Ability to Repay.—
(1) In General.—Any creditor with respect to a residential
mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability, may
presume that the loan has met the requirements of subsection (a), if the
loan is a qualified mortgage.
(2) Definitions.—. . .
(A) Qualified Mortgage.-- [defining the term over a page
of statutory text, including in relevant part: “(vi) that complies
with any guidelines or regulations established by the Board in
relation to ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income,
alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after
payment of total monthly debt, taking into account the income
levels of the borrower and such other factors as the Board may
127

See Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat. at 2139, § 1402, 124 Stat. 2142, § 1411.

128

Id. at 2143, § 129C(a)(3). One positive attribute of the comprehensiveness of this list is that its flexibility to
consider future income dispatches many of the parade of horribles advanced by detractors of regulation. See, e.g.,
Zywicki, supra note 119, at 79 (presenting example of medical resident on the cusp of profound salary increase).
129

Id. at § 129C(a)(4).

130

Id. at 2144, § 129C(a)(6).
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determine relevant and consistent with the purposes of described
in paragraph (3)(B)(i).”] 131
Note that this highly detailed statutory definition is in turn followed by a broad redefinition authority conferred in the subsequent subsection:
(3) Regulations.-- . . .
(B) Revision to Safe Harbor Criteria.-- The Board may
prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the
criteria that define a qualified mortgage upon a finding that such
regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible,
affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers in a
manner consistent with the purposes of this section, necessary
and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this section and
section 129B to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to
facilitate compliance with such sections.” 132
Making sense of this interpretative presumption is difficult. At first blush, it seems a
back-door resurrection of the excised “plain vanilla” rules that sought to privilege certain forms
of standard form mortgages (by according safe harbor) over others. 133 That is, by defining
qualified mortgages to exclude negative-amortizing mortgages, ones with certain high balloon
payments, etc., Dodd-Frank effectively privileges the residuum by according them a rebuttable
presumption of demonstrated ability to repay. It is not complete safe harbor from statutory
scrutiny, to be sure, but exemption (or, more precisely, rebuttable exemption) from one of its
more significant and transformative requirements. On the other hand, the privilege is perhaps
a hollow one, because in the multi-pronged definition of “qualified mortgage” lies the express
criterion of compliance with the Fed’s/Bureau’s guidelines and regulations relating to DTI,
131

Id. at § 1412, 124 Stat. 2145-46. Note that, cruelly, “Qualified Mortgages” are expressly different from
“Qualified Residential Mortgages.” The latter are part of the sexpartite multi-agency “Risk Retention Rules” that
were promulgated in initial proposed form on March 31, 2011. In requiring sponsors and securitizers of assetbacked securities to retain 5% of the credit risk for each securitization transaction, the regulators propose
exempting issuances that entirely comprise “qualified residential mortgages.” Credit Risk Retention by Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 144-45 (March 31, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 244) (proposed rulemaking),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11062.html. While the definition of “qualified
residential mortgage” is stringent, rule-based and includes an “ability to pay” requirement (28% “front end”
mortgage DTI and 36% total “back end” DTI), id. at 20, 127-30, 144-45, that definition “should not be interpreted in
any way as reflecting or suggesting the way in which the Qualified Mortgage standards under TILA [per DoddFrank]may be defined either in proposed or final form.” Id. at 103-04.
132

Id. at § 1412(b)(3), 124 Stat. 2148. On the transfer date, the authority over safe harbor criteria will go to the
CFPB. See id. at § 1061(b), 124 Stat. 2036.
133

See supra note 3 at 9-10.
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which surely stands in as a regulatory proxy for ability to pay. 134 Thus mortgages that have a
demonstrated ability to pay through Fed guidelines are rebuttably presumed to have an ability
to pay! (Perhaps this is not gibberish; for example, were the Fed to decline to issue any DTI
guidelines at all, then the safe harbor would presume ability to pay for otherwise qualified
mortgages, and hence the privileging would be doing some work. But if we anticipate a
subversive Fed trying to undermine the Act through refusal to pass DTI guidelines, why would
such a Fed not just exercise its regulatory power to define “qualified mortgage” more broadly
to exempt everything, as it clearly has power to do under section 1412(b)(3)(B)?) In sum, it is
not clear the enabling legislation provides much in the way of helpful guidance regarding
delineation of ability to pay.
B.

Kindred Regulations

Limited but nevertheless useful insight on how to interpret ability to pay can also likely
be gleaned from the regulations just promulgated under CARD that seek to provide guidance on
that statute’s duty to assess “ability to pay.” 135 The Fed took its crack with Proposed Rules in
October 2009 and followed up with Final rules in February 2010. The regulations provide credit
card lenders with a safe harbor if they assess repayment following certain assumptions, which
include that the full line of credit is drawn for new accounts and that the “real” APR (not the
teaser) is applied, but do not assume any fees are incurred (other than mandatory ones such as
annual ones) for fear they are “too speculative.” 136 (The inclusion of annual fees came after
protest over the “no fees” aspect of the Proposed Rule.) 137 Safe harbor does not require
verification of income, assets, etc., as is mandated under Dodd-Frank, because such a
requirement is “burdensome,” finds the Fed, especially for telephonic applications; plus there is
“no evidence,” it insists, of income-inflating liar loans in the credit card market. 138 Most
toothlessly, alas, the ability to pay analysis only requires scrutiny of the ability to make the
minimum monthly payment, not (as suggested by one commentator on the Proposed Rules)
scrutiny of payment that amortizes the loan within a reasonable period of time. This omission
134

See Dodd-Frank, at § 1412(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2145-46.

135

Truth in Lending, (March 18, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (final rulemaking), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110318b1.pdf. Note that additional insight
apparently cannot be gleaned – by regulatory command – from the new “Qualified Residential Mortgage”
provisions of the inter-agency Risk Retention Rules. See supra note 131.
136

Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,124, 54,127, 54,160-61, 54,125-26 (Oct. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226) (proposed rule), Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7660, 7721-22, (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) (final rule).
137

75 Fed. Reg. 7722.

138

74 Fed. Reg. 54,161, 75 Fed. Reg 7721.
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was grounded in part on statutory text of the specific “ability to pay” provision in CARD. 139
(Perhaps this lender leniency is why one banking lobbyist praised CARD’s ability to pay
regulations as having “worked OK, with some tweaks.”) 140
One recurrent comment after the Proposed Rules came out was for “more guidance” on
just how to measure ability to pay. This resulted in the Fed’s inclusion in the Final Rule of two
interesting additions. First, at the prodding of consumer advocates, numerical ratios were
injected: lenders must now “consider” the borrower’s debt to income ratio, debt to assets ratio,
or “residual income” (defined as the income left after the debtor services debt – but not living
expenses, so perhaps this is “quasi-net income”), although there is no specific trigger of what
might constitute an excessive ratio.141 Second, at the pushing of industry, the Fed allowed the
use of “reasonable policies and procedures” to estimate a borrower’s “obligations” in assessing
ability to pay, including income and asset estimates based on “empirically derived,
demonstrably and statistically sound models.” 142 The Fed’s discussion of the rules reveals
strong lobbying and a clear aversion by industry to conduct individual borrower analysis beyond
credit score review, modeling, and other quantitative algorithms. 143 (One worries about
reliance on statistical models after the financial collapse of 2008, but maybe the Fed envisions a
brave new world of even bigger, more unsinkable, models.) It is interesting to note that these
rules were being finalized during the jockeying over Dodd-Frank, which may explain the
incorporation of greater specificity into that statute’s text that follow wording from the Fed’s
regulations interpreting CARD (e.g., “residual income”).
Whether and to what degree these CARD regulations will help shed light on Dodd-Frank
remains to be seen. Indeed, even the revisions to the rules were insufficient guidance for
some, requiring a still further set of “clarifying” amendments that came down in March 2011,

139

74 Fed. Reg. 54,127, 75 Fed. Reg. 7721.

140

See Neddis, supra note 3.

141

75 Fed. Reg. 7660. “Residual income” is used elsewhere in federal housing regulation, such as by the Dept. of
Veterans Affairs in its underwriting standards for VA loans. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Opportunity House Committee on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (April 16, 2008), (statement of Judith
Cade, Director Loan Guaranty Service, Dept. of Veterans Affairs) (“Lenders underwriting VA loans must ensure that
the contemplated terms of repayment bear a proper relation to the veteran’s present and anticipated income and
expenses, and that the veteran is a satisfactory credit risk. VA’s credit standards employ the use of residual
income guidelines and debt-to-income ratios in determining the adequacy of the veteran’s income.”). For a good
discussion of this construct, see John Eggum, Katherine Porter and Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy:
Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1136.
142

75 Fed. Reg. 7660, 7718, 7720.

143

Cf. Ruth Simon, Banks Get Back to the People Business, WALL STREET JOURNAL, at C1 (March 7, 2011) (discussing
return to “character analysis” in loan underwriting in addition to numerical scoring).
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dealing with such down-in-the-weeds detail as how to define “household income.” 144 To the
extent this moving target can be tracked, it certainly seems consistent with further emphasis on
highly specific rules, a topic explored in more depth immediately below.
C.

Rules or Standards?

What about the perennial rules vs. standards debate? In lobbying against the
imposition of a suitability standard, the Mortgage Bankers Association warned against the perils
of a “subjective” standard of suitability, taking the position (as a back-up to rejecting the
suitability standard altogether) that were a federal intervention made, it would have to be
“clear and objective,” 145 i.e., a rule. 146 Yet at the same time it lobbied against subjectivity in
opposing a standard such as suitability (and, by analogy one assumes, ability to repay), the
Mortgage Bankers Assocation also railed against the dangers of a DTI ceiling of 45%. 147 Some
rules are apparently better than others. Section 1412 of Dodd-Frank clearly indicates that the
Fed could indeed say a borrower with a DTI above 45% lacks ability to pay, and so perhaps the
most significant interpretative impact of the qualified mortgage rebuttable presumption of
ability to pay is not so much its content (which could be rendered meaningless) but its explicit
countenancing of specific rules, such as DTI caps. Indeed, it is that possible approach that so
frightened regulators in the UK, 148 and perhaps explains the Europeans’ ambivalence. 149 As
discussed just above, the CARD regulations seem to be grasping toward rules that include
“consideration” of rule-like debt-to-income formulas, but in a watered-down sense that allow a
modeling bypass.
Accordingly, my conjecture is that as Dodd-Frank unfolds, we will see the proliferation
of many specific rules and formulas that in turn will be revised over time. 150 That is, in
144

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, TRUTH IN LENDING, 107, 111 (Mar. 18, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (final rulemaking).

145

Hirsch, supra note 12, at 27 (quoting lobbying positions).

146

It also insisted that any mortgage reform not entail a private right of action as a remedy, although one fails to
see how this follows from its insistence on objectivity over subjectivity. See id.
147

Id.

148

The 45% DTI ratio comes from, in part, proposals from consumer advocacy groups. See, e.g., Paul Leonard,
California Office Director Center for Responsible Lending, Remarks before California State Senate Banking, Finance
& Insurance Committee 12 (March 5, 2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgagelending/policy-legislation/states/final-3-05-08-senate-banking-testimony-on-fed-rules-final.pdf. Some of these
proposals are discussed in Hirsch, supra note 12, at 26.
149

See supra text accompanying note 103.

150

I make this prediction mindful of the explicit disassociation by the CFPB’s proto-head. See infra note 155. That
may well be her intention, but she will have to reverse a tide of rule-orientation. For the latest manifestation of
such rule-enthusiasm, see Credit Risk Retention supra note 131, at 20, 127-30 (multi-agency release specifying the
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prognosticating on the rules-standards continuum, I see rules rising ascendant. My prediction
stems from a culmination of factors: first, the specific cue in section 1412 to embrace such rules
as a DTI ratio; 151 second, the proliferation of prohibitory rules already in the statute (e.g., ban
on prepayment penalties for unqualified mortgage, 152 ban on mandatory arbitration for
residential mortgage loans under an open end consumer credit plan, 153 etc); third, the
conceptually contagious “niggling” provisions of the express statutory text, such as section
129C’s insistence on which types of tax documents to examine in underwriting a debtor’s
loan; 154 fourth, baseline hyperactivity of newly created and newly invigorated federal
agencies; 155 and finally, bureaucratic hindsight conviction that the recent housing collapse
might have been avoided had we simply retained rules like the pre-1982 hard LTV caps on
residential mortgages. One can even envision categorical bans of certain products (the analogy
of the accredited investor rule from securities law’s Regulation D comes to mind).156 The power
of the Fed to expand and contract the definition of a “qualified mortgage” as it sees fit surely
suggests the lesser power to pass such categorical rules banning products it sees as generating
an inherent risk of inability to pay. And rules and categories certainly seem popular with the

“risk retention rules” under Dodd-Frank, which exempt “qualified residential mortgage” securities from the 5%
retention requirement, which in turn are defined as mortgages where there is a mortgage DTI ratio of no more
than 28% and total DTI ratio of no more than 36%).
151

Dodd-Frank at § 1412(b)(2)(A)(vi), 124 Stat. 2146. Technically, one might envision a Fed regulation banning an
“unreasonable DTI” (i.e., a standard), but that borders on silly. Then again, in interpreting CARD, the Fed only
required vague “consideration” of DTI. See supra, note 135 at 108.
152

See Dodd-Frank at § 1414(a)(c)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(c)(3) 124 Stat. 2149-50.

153

See id. at § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.

154

Id. at § 129C(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2143.

155

The activity level of an agency will depend on its head, a point emphasized by many. See, e.g., Wright, supra
note 11 (emphasizing criticality of CFPB’s first director). Elizabeth Warren, one possible contender, has made clear
she has no intention of a regulatory binge if at the helm of the CFPB. Embracing a position of the Financial
Services Roundtable, Warren opines, “Instead of creating a regulatory thicket of ‘thou shalt nots,’ and instead of
using ever-more-complex disclosures that drive up costs for lenders and provide little help for consumers, let’s
measure our success with simple questions. . . . . Instead of layering on regulations that don’t fully protect
consumers, a better approach would focus on how to give consumers the power to make the right choices for their
families – and, at the same time, to ease the regulatory burden for the lenders.” Victoria McGrane and Maya
Jackson Randall, Banking’s Scourge on Charm Offensive, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 25, 2011) (reporting on
prepared remarks to the Financial Services Roundtable from September 2010).
156

See supra note 66. Note that the proto-CFBP head, at least in some contexts, appears to like categorical rules.
“It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and burning down your
house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one in-five chance of
putting the family out on the street.” Warren, supra note 112, at 8. But compare supra note 178.
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swath of regulations rolling out under Dodd-Frank. 157 Although the normative debate of
preference for rules or standards in regulating residential mortgages is not one I will wade into
at present (leaving the reader to review the interesting observations of others), 158 I will close by
noting that the proto-head of the CFBP, while at times having expressed interest in rules, has
gone on record in agreeing with banking industry leaders in the need to have flexible regulatory
standards. 159
D.

Sister Statutory Fields

How else might an “ability to pay” duty be operationalized? One area that has
confronted this problem recently has been bankruptcy law, where the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”) mandated an “ability to pay” screen for chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy through
revised 11 U.S.C. section 707(b). 160 There, Congress took two approaches to measuring ability
to repay debts in the bankruptcy context: a gross income screen and a net income screen. For
gross income, the statute deems bankrupt debtors unable to repay their debts as a matter of
law if they earn less than the applicable state median gross income. 161 For net income, the
statute specifies a highly detailed and routinized test of permissible budgetary expenses that is
largely driven by IRS guidelines used by field agents negotiating repayment schedules with tax

157

The March 31, 2011 Risk Retention Rules, see supra note 131, while explicitly impermissible to rely upon in
interpreting the mortgage lending ability to pay rules, do provide interesting insight on the presence of categorical
distinctions in analyzing ability to pay. For example, the rules explicitly say that ability to pay should be scrutinized
differently for an automobile loan (current income and DTI) than for a business loan (liabilities, leverage, and
coverage ratios). Id. at 150-52, 161-62.

158

Vincent DiLorenzo offers interesting analysis on whether Dodd-Frank signals an end to what he contends was
the disastrous “principles-based” standards approach that prevailed after 1982. He sees Dodd-Frank as clearly
“two steps forward” toward the resurgence of rules, but also feels the blanket quasi-cost-benefit constraint on
generating new regulations, see Dodd-Frank at §1031, 124 Stat. 2005-06, as “a step backward” toward standards.
DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 62-66, 81-83. Interestingly, Engel and McCoy too desire rules to standards, arguing
that the concept of suitability in the securities laws context (which generated standards) would transpose poorly to
mortgages. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1343-44.
159

See supra note 156, infra note 178. Warren’s comments are presumably intended as an olive branch to the
lending industry, but it is not clear (at least to me) that standards are strictly preferable to rules by the regulated
entities. Maybe they think standards provide plausible deniability for captured regulators? It seems equally likely,
as a theoretical matter, that they might actually prefer the certainty of brighter rules.

160

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-08, § 707, 119 Stat. 27
(2005).
161

Id. at § 707(b)(6)-(7); cf. § 707(b)(3) (re-imposing ability to pay for means-test passers under certain
circumstances).
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delinquents.162 What the brief experience of BAPCPA to date has taught us, however, is that
even a highly routinized “means tests” crafted by ex ante rule can create a maelstrom of ex
post litigation. For example, in the few years since its effective date, already three means test
statutory disputes have required Supreme Court intervention.163
This ominous BAPCPA lesson could lead to several possible outcomes. First, it might
embolden the Fed to seize upon per se gross income rules, deeming some products
categorically off limits for certain income demographics (or categorically permissible for
others). Second, it could be ignored (or passingly acknowledged) by a resolute Fed ready to
bite the bullet of crafting net income rules. 164 Note that England, for all its insistence of not
wanting to have hard and fast rules like LTV or DTI caps, apparently believes it will be able to
police an obligation on lenders to calculate “free disposable income,” a number that includes
deductions for “committed expenditures for the borrower’s and borrower’s dependents
(income tax, national insurance, utility bills, alimony and maintenance payments, school fees)
as well as personal expenditures (food, clothing, health and personal care, transport, recreation
and holidays).” 165 As such, the Fed might use the UK as a guinea pig in coming up with its own
BAPCPA-like list of deductions in getting to the appropriate “income” that grounds the ability to
pay analysis. (It is also, of course, possible the Fed learns the ultimate BAPCPA lesson and tries
to fob everything off to the IRS.) 166

E.

Complicating Considerations

Complicating the analysis of what ability to pay regulation will look like is the issue of
pre-emption. Weighing in on a long-fought battle, 167 Dodd-Frank makes clear that federal preemption of state consumer protection laws is lifted; federal law is to become a “floor” from
162

Id. at § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V) (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense
amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses
for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”).

163

See Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S, 130 S.Ct.
1324 (2010), Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).

164

This seems unlikely based on the experience of the new CARD amendments to Regulation Z, supra note 135, at
108. There, the Fed initially suggested that lenders be required to consider a debtor’s “obligations” in gauging
ability to pay in its proposed rules, but then when pressed for more guidance in the final rules, simply suggested
“consideration” ofspecific financial ratios, such as DTI, DTA, or something called “residual income,” which was
defined as income after service of debts (which is better thought of as “quasi-net income”).
165

Mortgage Market Review, supra note 105, at 16, 23. I am mindful of Fannie and Freddie’s automated
underwriting systems, which provide perhaps some basis of measuring ability to pay, but I have diminished
confidence in the output of those institutions.
166

Note that either path would be consistent with a prediction of rules-orientation.

167

See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
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which more consumer-protective states are free to depart upward. 168 This raises the prospect
that some practices that survive categorical proscription at the federal level may nevertheless
be banned by specific states (so long as not creating an actual conflict). 169 Compounding this
potential confusion is the restriction on remedies. One of the fighting lines in the battle over
Dodd-Frank was the creation of a private right of action for consumers, which was resolved in
favor of industry by generally omitting such relief. 170 But the new pre-emption rule now
implies a state could permit its own consumer protection laws that do allow private rights of
action to persist and grant consumers newfound powers, liberated from the yoke of federal
pre-emption.171 (Indeed, Dodd-Frank’s resurrection of assignee-liability suggests that even
more putative defendants will be added to the mix than perhaps previously imagined.) 172 The
final aspect of this wildcard is the rollback of mandatory arbitration. 173 Not only will many
matters of dispute now reach court for public, media-attracting resolution, but the full judicial
powers of preclusion and precedential effect will attach. Accordingly, while I foresee myriad
rules coming out of the regulatory maw in the upcoming years, I cannot foreclose at the same
time the interpretation of those rules (or similar, stronger state ones) effectively being
168

See Dodd-Frank, at § 1041, 124 Stat. 2011.

169

It is difficult to overstate the co-federalism significance of Dodd-Frank. The Attorney General of Indiana
recently remarked in public comments that state regulators are conscious of the significant role they will be
expected to play in co-enforcing the new financial reforms laws. See Hon. Greg Zoeller, Attorney General of
Indiana, Remarks at the 2011 Marquette Law School Public Service Program: New Directions in Consumer and
Community Financial Protection (Feb. 25, 2011). Legal writing is emerging too on this topic. See, e.g., Lauren
Saunders, National Consumer Law Center, The Role of the States Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dec. 2010) (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act’s explicit invocation of state coenforcement of consumer protection and restricted preemption of state consumer protection laws), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf.
170

This is a crude generalization. Some significant private causes of action survive and are enhanced under DoddFrank. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank at § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141 (creating cause of action against mortgage originators that
violate § 129B of the Truth in Lending Act, a prohibition on steering incentives); § 1413, 124 Stat. 2148-9 (allowing
defense by recoupment or setoff to residential foreclosure by asserting creditor violated prohibition on steering
incentives or ability to pay standard); § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151 (prescribing that no residential mortgage loan term
can waive a statutory cause of action or bar a consumer from bringing an action for damages or relief in
connection with any alleged violation of Title XIV provisions). For discussion of the private action battle, see
Hirsch, supra note 12, at 27. That said, a generally private cause of action for violations of the statute is neither
express nor implied.
171

Indeed, many state “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” statutes (UDAPs) provide for private causes of
action, unlike the FTC Act. See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices. Engel and
McCoy discuss the uses of these statutes in combating predatory lending. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 61, at
1303-105. For an example of a recovery, see, e.g., Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp. (D. N.J., Sept. 4, 2007)
(unsuitable mortgage for 82-year-old homeowner violated state UDAP).
172

See Dodd-Frank, at § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141.

173

Id. at § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.
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transferred to, or perhaps even hijacked by, the courts. (Imagine at the extreme a resurgence
of the heady 1960’s unconscionability caselaw.) 174
In final analysis, then, notwithstanding the pre-emption and private action wrinkles, the
most likely implementation of the new ability to pay duty will be a proliferation of constantly
updating rules emanating from the Fed. Naysayers, of course, predict whatever comes out will
be indecipherable: “We have such nebulous terms as ‘reasonable ability to repay.’” 175 But
those are cheap shots. As discussed above, suitability standards have been around for decades
in securities law, and somehow that system has survived. 176
III.

Comment: What Does It All Mean?

Whatever its form of implementation, the question arises whether shouldering banks
with a requirement to assess their customers’ ability to pay will be all that big deal. It will. This
is so both for the actual doctrinal effect as well as the broader expressive significance. The
actual doctrinal effect will unfold through the effective nationalization of underwriting
standards that the Fed/Bureau will exercise under its new regulatory powers. 177 That is a
return to 1982. The broader conceptual leap (as we saw with the U.K.’s crumbling resistance to
“responsible lending”) lies in dispatching the fictions that acquiring a suitable mortgage is fully
up to the borrower alone and that assessing its rightful fit is up to him alone too as an armslength contractual counterparty. Relatedly, the duty to analyze ability to repay constitutes
recognition of the failure in relying upon market forces alone to discipline lenders (i.e.,
admitting the natural profit motives of lenders did not assure the extension of credit to
repayment-likely borrowers). A duty – an affirmative mandate imposed by the state – now lies
on mortgage lenders to assure their erstwhile contractual adversaries can pay back their loans.
The imposition of this new, proto-fiduciary duty fundamentally changes the landscape of how
we understand the debtor-creditor relationship in the consumer realm. This transformation is
significant, but it comes of course with two very likely consequences: first, an increased
paternalistic regulatory mindset (pejoratively, the rise of the “nanny state”), and second,
reduction/rationing in mortgage credit. 178
174

See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Hirsch, supra note 12, at
36-42 (discussing private litigations seeking relief against lenders for “unsuitable” mortgages).
175

111 Cong. Rec. H5182 (2009) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-05-06/pdf/CREC-2009-0506-pt1-PgH5179-2.pdf (Rep. Hensarling).
176

Although I must confess to being a non-expert in securities law. Conducting the rich empirical research of
asking a colleague who is, I was informed that the FINRA arbitrations are actually quite useless in crafting
standards for “suitability,” because the generalist arbitrators are usually poorly versed in underlying securities laws
and norms.
177

A co-participant at a recent conference on the CFPB gets credit for the insight that ability to pay is effectively a
compulsory underwriting term.
178

See supra note 155.
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Lest there be any doubt, paternalism was Epithet Number One hurled at Dodd-Frank in
the battles over its passage. As one opponent railed, “This is Uncle Sam telling you, with a
couple of exceptions, if you can’t qualify for a 30-year fixed mortgage, then we are going to
deny you the homeownership opportunity in America, because we are smarter than you. We
know better than you. We have to protect you from yourself.” 179 Condemned another, “That is
not the American Dream; that’s the Government Dream.” 180 The title of one prominent jurist’s
Op Ed said it all: “Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults.” 181
Dodd-Frank is paternalistic – highly so. Supporters can squirm at this attribute as a
necessary evil, distract critics with the panglossian distinction between “libertarian” and
“ordinary” paternalism, 182 or otherwise try to deflect this charge by changing the subject. But
the better approach is to confront it head on and celebrate the law’s inherent paternalism. 183
After all, the evil (for those who see it as an evil) of paternalism lies in reducing the autonomy
and dignity of private contracting actors. 184 But if the market is malfunctioning, 185 and
179

145 Cong. Rec. at H5182 (Rep. Hensarling).

180

Id. at H5183 (Rep. Neugebauer).

181

See Posner, supra note 122. In what he presumably considers hyperbole, Posner rhetorically questions
regarding prepayment penalties, “[M]ortgages that include such penalties compensate by charging a lower interest
rate. Is the choice among such alternatives really beyond the cognitive competence of the average home buyer?”
The Fed has some insight on that question. In a recent study, it found 68% of respondents could not identify
whether a mortgage disclosure statement revealed that the underlying mortgage contained a prepayment penalty,
and only 5%, having found it, could identify what that penalty amount was. See James M. Lacko & Janis K.
Pappalardo, Fed. Trade Comm’n, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND
PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS 78-79 (2007), available
athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf.
182

See id. (“Mr. Thaler, whose views are taken seriously by the Obama administration, calls himself a ‘libertarian
paternalist.’ But that is an oxymoron. He is a paternalist with a velvet glove—as the agency will be.”).

183

For one article doing so, see Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1119 (2010)
(“If greater financial freedom means giving people unlimited choices and the unfettered opportunity to go deeper
into debt, then less financial freedom and fewer choices would be better for many people because it would make
them happier and ultimately increase their well-being.”).

184

For a nice roundup of Kantian concerns, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine,
and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 220 (2000) (discussing concern that paternalistic legal
interventions accord “insufficient respect for the underlying valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the
autonomous agent”).
185

Note too that the economics of the subprime market are fiercely contested. For example, in a scholarly debate
on the merits of regulatory intervention, both Engel & McCoy and Zywicki & Adamson lay greater claim to Stiglitz &
Weiss’s informational asymmetries, see Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). See Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1258, 1278, 1280-84;
Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 119, at 71, 73, 78-82. The latter claim that their basic model suggests it is
madness to saddle the lender with a duty to know the private information of the borrower, while the former retort
that the complexity of current credit instruments and sophistication of credit scoring algorithms actually do
diminish (and arguably reverse) the asymmetry.
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especially if the basis of that malfunction is in part deception, then the autonomy concerns
largely evaporate.186 Moreover, with autonomy concerns set aside, the instrumentalist
benefits of using the lenders as the policy targets is clear. 187 (As for the sub-debate of “hard”
vs. “soft” paternalism,188 I can nudge the reader into considering the emerging draft of the EU
directive on responsible mortgage lending. Under that proposal (at least in its first iteration),
mortgage lenders will be burdened with a suitability duty toward their borrowers, but the duty
may be waiveable with sufficient disclosure.) 189

186

See John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 454-55 (exploring
paternalism critiques to consumer credit regulation).
187

See, e.g., id. at 432-34 (discussing reasons lenders, rather than borrowers, are more likely to be cheapest-cost
implementers of oversight policy); Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1336-37 (same, regarding mortgage lenders
specifically).
188

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHICAGO L.
REV. 1159 (2003). For a discussion of various forms of paternalism, including “soft” and “hard,” see Evans and
Wright, supra note 2, at 30-31.
189

See supra note 104 (suggesting this option may actually have been eliminated by the most recent version
proposal). But cf. Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1348 (counseling against waiver as permissible autonomy
intrusion justified by utilitarian considerations).
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The second grievance with the new ability to pay duty is simply the well known lament
of usury law opponents: reduction in credit availability, either through pernicious substitution
or outright rationing.190 “The more likely result of stricter mortgage origination rules is a return
to rationing, which could result in lower overall homeownership since some of the recent
increase in homeownership was due to the ability of subprime borrowers to access credit.” 191
This worrying even made it into the legislative debates. One opponent complained, for
example, that “this bill . . . will functionally be taking away homeownership opportunities from
American people. . . . . So, ultimately what we are going to have are fewer mortgages being
made.” 192 Another predicted that homeownership after Dodd-Frank will be made “more
expensive and less available to those people who need it the most.” 193
Again, the appropriate rejoinder to this rhetoric is direct admission and
confrontation. 194 One of the intended consequences of Dodd-Frank is for fewer people to
acquire mortgages – those who lack the ability to repay them in the cold calculus of rigorous
underwriting. Of course there will be errors, both Type I and II. 195 The question is whether one
type is preferable to the other. The mantra of increased homeownership as an intrinsic social
good presumes the former are better than the latter, but that is far from clear. 196 On the
190

See, e.g., James J. White, The Usury Tromp l’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000) (against usury laws); see also Cathy L.
Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and
the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000) (for usury laws). An empirical cottage industry has
developed seeking to prove the link between usury laws and credit availability. For a recent example of this
conceit, at least carefully executed and specifically focusing on subprime mortgage lending, see Giang Ho and
Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit, 60 J. URB.
ECON. 210 (2006).
191

Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 119, at 78.

192

145 Cong. Rec. at H5181-82 (Rep. Hensarling).

193

111 Cong. Rec. H5176 (2009) (Rep. Sessions).

194

Consider in this regard the emerging UK proposal envisions making it even harder for “credit impaired”
borrowers to get a mortgage by requiring a 20% “buffer” in calculating “free disposable income.” See Consultation
Paper, supra note 108.
195

Indeed, some researchers have noted that credit restriction may be ill-founded. See, e.g., Debbie Guienstein
Bocian, Keith S. Ernst, & Wei Li, Center for Responsible Lending, Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on
the Price of Subprime Mortgages (2006). This might be considered a “Type I ½” error.

196

See, e.g., Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges, Remarks of Fed. Bd. Member Edward M.
Gramlich, Financial Services Roundtable Meeting, May 21, 2004 (noting that increased foreclosures of subprime
loans “do not seem high enough to challenge the overall positive assessment” of increased homeownership).
Professor DiLorenzo explores Governor Gramlich’s comments on subprime lending in more detail in his
comprehensive analysis, including his clashes with then-Chairman Alan Greenspan. See DiLorenzo, supra note 23,
at 80. The implementation of this vision through legislation such as the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial
Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq., and its related enabling of HUD to target “goals” of portfolio
percentages of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to LMI, see HUD’s Proposed Affordable Housing Goals: Fannie Mae’s
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contrary, the spillover effects of the housing collapse – shown in the dropping property values
of the non-foreclosed neighbors – has sharpened our appreciation of the dangers of “false
grantings” of mortgage credit.197 Even staunch critic Jack Guttentag admits, “Perhaps the costs
associated with borrowers who fail [in their mortgages] – costs to both themselves and their
communities – more than offset the benefits to those who succeed.” 198 (And this worry was
published in 2007, when the ice was just beginning to crack.) Accordingly, rather than
awkwardly tap-dance around the reduction in mortgage origination possible from Dodd-Frank’s
elimination of asset-based mortgage lending, I embrace it and find its likely social costs dwarfed
by its welfare benefits.
Conclusion
While they are not fiduciaries, mortgage lenders are now no longer arms-length
contractual counterparties: they have a duty to assess a prospective borrower’s ability to repay
her loan.199 Reliance on the asset value alone, or on flipping the debt to another through
securitization, will no longer suffice. This dramatically transforms the debtor-creditor
relationship in the residential mortgage market. This article has tried to chart the source of this
innovation by showing how it did not spring fully formed from Chris Dodd’s head. Lenders’
duties of “responsible lending” (in the European parlance) have a rich pedigree, both domestic
and foreign. The article also offered conjecture as to how this new duty will unfold in the
United States, predicting a swath of new technical rules of great specificity from appropriate
agencies. Finally, it briefly registered its alignment with the supportive normative camp: DoddFrank is not just a big deal for the mortgage markets, but a good deal. Properly interpreted, the
duty to analyze ability to repay could re-align the residential mortgage market and ensure that
2008 becomes a closed chapter in commercial law history.
Comment Letter (May 8, 2000), seems ill-considered in retrospect. For a general literature review on the social
benefits of homeownership, see Christopher Herbert & Eric S. Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of LowIncome and Minority Famili8es: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, HUD, (Feb. 2006).
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A rich literature exists on this topic. Foreclosures drag everyone down. See, e.g., Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt
& Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL ESTATE FINAN. ECON.
387 (2009) (collecting studies on the threat foreclosures pose to neighborhood property value); Center for
Responsible Lending, Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billion in 2009 Alone; 69.5
Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average Over Next Four Years, 91.5 Million Families to Lose $1.9 Trillion in Home
Value; $20,300 on Average (May 2009) (estimating that foreclosures in 2009 caused 69.5 million neighboring
homes to experience price declines averaging $7,200 per home, resulting in a $501.9 billion devaluation in total
property values).
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Guttentag, supra note 119.

199

As a black letter matter, the duty of course runs to the borrower. Given the negative social consequences of
the housing market collapse, however, an interesting argument can be made that the duty is owed to the public
more broadly. Such a contention, while conceptually intriguing, likely faces an uphill doctrinal battle under current
law. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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